




Directorate of  
Intelligence

**Top Secret**

25X1



25X1

# Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

**15 March 1983**

**Top Secret**

NESA M 83-10066CX  
SOVA M 83-10050CX

15 March 1983

25X1

*Copy*

**67**

**Page Denied**

TOP SECRET

25X1

## AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

### CONTENTS

--	--	--

25X1

MASOOD AWARE OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES . . . . . 2

Masood has thwarted a number of Soviet attempts to infiltrate agents into the Panjsher Valley.

25X1

MORALE IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN AFGHANISTAN . . . . . 2

Insurgent morale in central and western Afghanistan is generally high, though traditional landowners are showing some sentiment for a political settlement.

25X1

25X1

### PERSPECTIVE

FAILURE OF SOVIET ADVISERS . . . . . 5

Soviet advisers oversee all activities of the Afghan Government and Communist Party, but they have generally been unable to ensure that Soviet policies are implemented effectively.

25X1

25X1

This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to

25X1

25X1



15 March 1983

NESA M 83-10066CX

SOVA M 83-10050CX

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

TOP SECRET

25X1

## MASOOD AWARE OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

25X1

[redacted] the Panjsher insurgent leader has thwarted a number of Soviet attempts to infiltrate agents into insurgent groups in the valley. The discovery of one agent, who operated a heavy machinegun, led to the unmasking of three other agents equipped with radios to send information to the Soviets. After the sixth Panjsher Valley offensive in September 1982, Masood captured an 11-year-old boy whom the Soviets had ordered to follow the insurgent leader. The boy was ordered to report Masood's location and his contacts. The Soviets reportedly gave the boy three months of accelerated intelligence training in the Soviet Union.

25X1

Comment:

25X1

25X1

[redacted] The Soviets appear to be attempting to get as much information as possible by sending a large number of relatively inexperienced agents into the area.

25X1

25X1

## MORALE IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN AFGHANISTAN

25X1

[redacted] Mujahadeen leaders based in the Hazarajat and in western Afghanistan who are former military officers, clerics, or members of the educated class show no sign of weakening their resolution to fight Soviet/DRA forces. The morale of the rank-and-file insurgents is also high, their most common complaint being that they lack good weapons. The civilians complain of insurgent leaders' subjecting them to forced labor and will be receptive to appeals from the reform-minded. Civilian morale, however, is sustained by the mullahs' war relief organization, and fear of air attacks apparently becomes disabling only where villagers have no antiaircraft weapons.

25X1

25X1

15 March 1983

25X1

NESA M 83-10066CX

SOVA M 83-10050CX

TOP SECRET

25X1

Traditional landowners, meanwhile, are wearying of the fighting because their privileged status has not improved and the quality of their lives has diminished. Young, reform-minded members of the educated class are enjoying their enhanced status in the resistance and are beginning to challenge the landowners' authority. Thus, the traditional landowners are showing some sentiment for starting the political process toward an eventual settlement, though they are not themselves ready to negotiate directly with the Soviets.

25X1

Comment: Given the generally good morale of the insurgent leaders and the rank-and-file, the insurgent war effort in central and western Afghanistan will probably remain vigorous. The traditional landowners' sentiment for a political settlement may increase as their status diminishes, but the very erosion of their social position will itself reduce the significance of their political stance. Their stance will also be tempered by the realization that government control of their area would also ultimately lead to a decline of their status and landholdings.

25X1

25X1

15 March 1983  
NESA M 83-10066CX  
SOVA M 83-10050CX

25X1

**Page Denied**

TOP SECRET

25X1

PERSPECTIVE

FAILURE OF SOVIET ADVISERS

25X1

25X1

We estimate that there are around 4,000 Soviet civilian advisers and technicians, and 3,500 military advisers in Afghanistan. There are also several hundred advisers from other Communist countries. The advisers oversee all activities of the Afghan Government and Communist Party, but they have generally been unable to ensure that Soviet policies are implemented effectively.

25X1

Foreign Affairs

Soviet advisers have almost complete control of Kabul's foreign policy. We believe that the few differences that occasionally surface are usually the result of deliberate negotiating tactics rather than actual disagreements between Moscow and Kabul.

25X1

A number of factors contribute to the Soviet advisers' success in the Foreign Ministry:

-- The advisers--Soviet Embassy officers acting on instructions from Moscow--have more authority than their counterparts in other ministries. In most of the government, Afghan officials have a much better chance of successfully appealing the advisers' decisions to the embassy or other Soviet authorities in Kabul or Moscow.

-- Foreign Minister Dost has little political influence and so is not inclined to dispute Soviet decisions.

-- Diplomatic notes and foreign policy statements by senior government officials are not subject to the sabotage by lower level officials that frustrates Soviet efforts in most other ministries.

-- There is little the insurgents can do to interfere with the formulation of foreign policy.

25X1

15 March 1983

NESA M 83-10066CX

SOVA M 83-10050CX

TOP SECRET

25X1

Below the policy level, however, Soviet control is as weak as elsewhere in the government. Low-level officials--because of sympathy for the resistance or bribery--have issued passports to those they knew were trying to flee Afghanistan. Because of the lack of qualified Communists, many non-Communists remain in the foreign service. These diplomats sometimes try to undercut Kabul's policies or pass information to countries opposed to the Afghan Communists. When reassigned to Kabul--even if reassignment includes a promotion--professional diplomats frequently ask for political asylum.

25X1

25X1

The Military

25X1

Despite the authority and presence of Soviet advisors throughout the Afghan military, the Afghan military rarely implements Soviet plans



25X1

15 March 1983

NESA M 83-10066CX

SOVA M 83-10050CX

TOP SECRET

25X1

effectively. The junior officers and noncommissioned officers who actually lead the Afghan soldiers in combat and are responsible for morale and discipline are usually not under direct Soviet supervision. Through active collusion with the insurgents, lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause, lack of ability or experience, and dislike of overbearing Soviet advisers, Afghan soldiers rarely perform well and sometimes sabotage operations. [redacted]

25X1

Afghan commanders at a higher level are under direct Soviet supervision, but they too--either deliberately or through incompetence--often frustrate Soviet plans. Despite injunctions from Kabul to obey the advisers, Afghan commanders sometimes refuse to obey, forcing the adviser to appeal to his superiors to have his advice upheld or to have the Afghan commander replaced. [redacted]

25X1

#### The Paramilitary

The Soviets have little direct control over the police and other organizations under the Interior Ministry such as Defense of the Revolution units. An organization the Afghans refer to as the "Soviet Ministry of Interior" parallels the organization of the ministry and supposedly oversees all its activities. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] there are very few advisers assigned to police and paramilitary units in the provinces. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] only one Soviet was assigned to the police in Balkh--one of the more important provinces. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] no Soviets are assigned to either the Kabul Province or Kabul City police forces.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Cuban advisers have some role in the Defense of the Revolution organization. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the Soviets and East Germans working in the Interior Ministry are primarily technicians and instructors, not policymakers. Some Soviet military personnel assigned to the ministry apparently are concerned only with criminal cases involving Soviet troops. Through KHAD,

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

however, the Soviets have considerable indirect influence on the investigation and disposition of political crimes, which are probably of far more interest to the Soviets than the criminal offenses the police deal with largely on their own.

25X1

Education

Except for a few Soviet professors at Afghan universities--some in posts occupied by Soviets long before the Communists came to power--Soviets have no direct contact with Afghan students. Soviet advisers in the Education Ministry, however, have successfully revised the curriculum in Afghan schools, resulting in great emphasis on political indoctrination at all levels and the introduction of translations of Soviet textbooks for most subjects. With many teachers unemployed, the ministry has been able to select only those--many of them Communists--who are willing to support the government, and thereby avoid much of the sabotage that plagues the implementation of other Soviet programs. The ministry, however, controls education in only a small part of the country. In most of Afghanistan, what survives of the education system is run by village elders, Islamic clergy, or the resistance.

25X1

The Press

Immediately after the invasion, Soviet advisers had tight control of the Afghan press, and many articles were authored in Moscow. Direct Soviet control has declined, although there is still strong indirect control through other organs of the Afghan Government, and the press still follows the Soviet line closely. Soviet newsmen also influence the media, placing stories in the Afghan press or requesting articles or information for Soviet publications, but the authority of Soviet journalists is unclear--even to the journalists themselves. Soviet news services also supply most foreign news that appears in Afghan media.

25X1

25X1

The Communist Party

25X1

15 March 1983


NESA M 83-10066CX

SOVA M 83-10050CX

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1




25X1

[redacted] the party advisers in Kabul have little or no control over the formulation of party policy or appointments to party posts. Because of the deep divisions in the Afghan party, these issues have to be dealt with at a much higher level, sometimes by calling Afghan Communist leaders to Moscow. Even Moscow's intervention has not lessened the party's deep rifts.

25X1

Other Ministries



25X1


[redacted] neither the Finance Minister nor the Commerce Minister pays much attention to the advisers. The Soviets have a good deal of control over Kabul's economic policies, but [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] this is owing to Afghan dependence on Soviet trade and aid, not the advisers. Soviet advisers with the Ministry of Mines seem to be concerned primarily with such things as petroleum exploration, not government policies.

25X1

25X1



25X1



25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

The lack of direct supervision of low-level government employees--whether ministry clerks or Army enlisted men--is one of the major reasons Soviet advisers have little control over government performance. When the low-level employees do not affect government activities--such as in the formulation of foreign policy--or when, as in the hiring of teachers, the government has been able to find enough loyal employees, Soviet policies have been implemented fairly effectively. In most of the government, however, incompetence and sympathy for the resistance have effectively sabotaged the advisers' efforts.

25X1

Another major problem has been the lack of Afghan Government authority in much of the country. Neither the Soviet party advisers nor the Afghan Communists are able to operate in rural areas. The Soviets' lack of interest in ministries such as Public Works may be because of a realization that their inability to operate in most of the countryside precludes their having much influence on popular attitudes.

25X1

15 March 1983

NESA M 83-10066CX  
SOVA M 83-10050CX

25X1

**Top Secret**

**Top Secret**